It is natural to ask if requiring the players to carry the same amount on average might also ensure a fair game. When "on average" is interpreted as requiring both players' distributions to have the same mean, Merryfield, et al. point out that the game may not be fair. In fact, they give an example that shows it is possible to have a smaller mean than one's opponent and still be at a disadvantage (that is, have a negative expected payoff). At the end of their paper, they pose the following question:
If we suppose that the distributions of players A and B are required to have the same means, is there a strategy that player A could adopt to have a winning edge? In other words, is there a preferred distribution (or a winning strategy)? [2] The answer to this question depends upon whether knowledge of an opponent's strategy, not just the mean, is assumed. In this article, we show that if a player knows her opponent's strategy, then she can construct a winning strategy which has the same positive mean or median as her opponent. This implies that there is no optimal strategy (or Nash equilibrium) when players are restricted to use strategies with the same mean or median. We consider both the discrete and continuous cases. Throughout, we assume that players' distributions are independent.
Discrete distributions Consider an example using discrete distributions. Suppose players A, B, and C use strategies given by independent random variables X, Y , and Z , respectively. Suppose X places probability 1 on $2, Y places probability 1/2 on both $1 and $3, while Z places probability 3/4 and 1/4 on $1 and $5, respectively. Notice that the mean of each distribution is $2. Using the notation developed by Merryfield, et al. [2] , let W A/B be the random variable returning the amount of money that player A wins (or loses) when playing against player B, that is, 
. Thus, strategy X is preferred to strategy Y . The following matrix, which is similar to one used by Kraitchik [1] , is used to
th entry of the matrix, m i j , is the amount that player B wins or loses when carrying y i in his wallet, while player C is carrying z j in her wallet; this occurs with probability p i q j .
Calculating E(W B/C ) requires summing the products of the matrix entries and their probabilities; in this case, We construct for player A a random variable X that defeats Y . Player A's strategy is to win almost every game; however, when player A loses, she forfeits a large amount of money. Interestingly, player A need only place positive probability on three values, regardless of the complexity of player B's distribution. Define X by the distribution of probabilities p i on monetary values x i as follows: 2 , where p 1 and x 2 satisfy the following conditions,
Notice that p 1 exists since p 0 = q 0 = 1. Also, x 2 is defined such that µ X = µ Y . As in the example above, it is convenient to view the Wallet Game in matrix form. Although we do not know how x 2 compares to the y i s, we assume the worst-case scenario for player A, that is, x 2 is greater than the largest monetary value that player B carries, y n . As before, the matrix entries are payoffs to player A.
The expected values of the first column and first row cancel because
Since x 1 < y i when i > 0, the remaining entries in the second row yield a positive contribution to the expected value for player A in the amount of p 1 (q 1 y 1 + q 2 y 2 + · · · + q n y n ), or p 1 µ Y . In this worst-case scenario, x 2 > y n implies that the remaining entries in the third row contribute the following to the expected value of player A
Hence, we have
by the definition of p 1 . Therefore, X Y .
In our earlier example, and as indicated in the above proposition, playing the mean with probability one can be defeated. However, it is a winning strategy against all other symmetric, discrete distributions. In this case, player A loses half of the time with loss µ X , but wins half of the time with a gain that is greater than µ X . Hence, the expected payoff is positive. In the next section we focus on continuous density functions and examine the roles of both the mean and median.
Continuous Density Functions
Suppose that random variables X and Y have continuous density functions f and g, respectively. Recall that a continuous density function never places positive probability on a single value; that is, the probability of a player carrying a specific amount of money is zero. As in the discrete case, if g is a symmetric density function then playing the mean with probability one (or equivalently, the median) is preferred to g. Although playing the mean with probability one does not satisfy our restriction to continuous density functions, this idea is easily modified to show the existence of a continuous density function with the same mean (and median) that defeats the original symmetric density function.
We do this in the following proposition, considering nonsymmetric, continuous density functions where players are required to have the same median. Denote the median of the random variable X as m X . Thus it is equally likely that the player has more than or less than m X . Since there is no optimal continuous density function when the distributions are required to have the same median, let's consider the case where they have the same mean. The following proposition shows that there is no optimal continuous density function in this case either. The proof is constructive, as in the discrete case, and the motivation for the strategy is similar. Once again, Player A's strategy is to win more frequently than player B, while infrequently losing a large sum of money. We construct a density function that matches the opponent on Proof. Suppose player A knows that player B carries an amount of money given by the random variable Y with continuous density function g. Suppose g has mean µ Y and median m Y . As in the discrete proof, the goal is to construct a density function that defeats g while having the same mean. Let γ be the average conditional expected value of g conditioned on being in the interval
Let X be a random variable with density function f defined by
elsewhere, where 0 < < 1 is selected so that n − > m Y + , where
and so that the following inequality holds:
Notice that the left side of (1) converges to γ as approaches zero, while the right side converges to γ − m Y . Also, n grows without bound as approaches zero. Therefore, a sufficiently small can be chosen to satisfy both inequalities. Although (1) To see that X Y , we employ a matrix again. As in the previous proof, we consider the worst-case scenario for player A. 
